

L E C T U R E

SO/OSS WAR PLANNING, ETO, WORLD WAR II

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Chief Instructor

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SO/OSS WAR PLANNING, ETO, WORLD WAR II

I INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the Lesson

To give an historical example of war planning by a U.S. clandestine services organization.

B. Scope

It will include:

1. Organization for planning and operations by the SO Branch of OSS at Theater Headquarters level, and organization for coordination with the British SOE.
2. Problems of coordination with the French FFI.
3. Plans developed at Theater Headquarters level for support by clandestine paramilitary forces to the military invasion of the Continent, and post-invasion military operations on the Continent.
4. Organization for coordination at Army Group and Army Headquarters level of plans for clandestine support of military operations.
5. Lessons learned.

C. Preface

It is necessary for the students to keep in mind the situation existing during the war-planning period in the SO Branch of OSS, as distinguished from the situation today. In England, SO had approximately 18 months within which the plan for support of active military operations by clandestine forces could be worked out prior to the beginning of those military operations. But it was during a period of open hostilities, which made many of the factors influencing the

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development of the plan quite different, in all likelihood, from those which will affect your planning task. Similar to your task, it was advance planning, during a period of planning military operations and the build-up for carrying out the military plan. At this point, however, similarity ends. The following are some of the conditions existing then, differing from the present.

During the planning period, very active clandestine operations of the paramilitary type were being conducted, as distinguished from the very limited organizing for such operations that CIA is conducting today. During the conduct of these operations, no holds were barred; there had been previous declarations of war by all the parties concerned. The current operations were considered by the British opposite organization, the Special Operations Executive (SOE), to be a form of economic warfare, and the SOE at that time actually was a division of the Ministry of Economic Warfare of the British Government. It was recognized, however, that these clandestine operations could provide material support for the military operations to be conducted in the future. Therefore, planning to switch SOE over to military control, and planning for support of military operations proceeded concurrently with planning for the military operations. The war situation existing then during the planning period made the planning task simpler, in all probability, from the planning task confronting you now. It was easier to get decisions or approval of plans at higher levels and such decisions were made and approvals granted much more rapidly. Every resource of the

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nations concerned that could be allocated to the clandestine organizations was made available without qualification to those organizations. It might be said that, as distinguished from the probable planning situation of today, planning then was done under ideal conditions. As further background necessary to an understanding of the World War II clandestine services war planning, it must be realized that SOE had been in existence and actively in the business some three years before OSS, etc.

QUESTIONS?

II ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS BY THE SO BRANCH OF OSS AT THEATER HEADQUARTERS LEVEL, AND ORGANIZATION FOR COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH SOE.

A. Establishment of Special Operations (SO) Branch, OSS, in the ETO and First Problems of Coordination with the British.

OSS was created 13 June 1942 by Presidential Military Order, and placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, it was not until about December, 1942, that JCS published a directive setting out the OSS responsibilities and jurisdiction.

OSS General Order #9, 3 Jan 43, created the Special Operations Branch (ETO SO War Diary, Vol. 12, page 13, and Vol. 1, page 1).

The order assigned as SO responsibilities:

1. Conduct of sabotage in enemy and enemy-occupied countries.
2. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.
3. Support and supply of resistance groups.

Therefore, it can be said that on the whole, the SO Branch had

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responsibilities parallel with those of ^MPCS/CIA today, with the possible exception of the resistance problem.

An officer was designated by the Director, OSS, as chief of the SO Branch in London in June, 1942, but apparently he was powerless to do anything until after JCS issued its directive. In January, 1943, the Chief, SO Branch, OSS, Washington, went to London, relieved the officer mentioned, and proceeded to organize an SO Branch within the "London Mission, OSS". This man also was a representative of the Director, OSS, for negotiations with the military forces, U.S., in London. The London Mission, OSS, apparently came into existence about the same time. No authority for it had been obtained first from either the JCS or the War Department, and no notice had been given concerning it to the Commanding General, ETOUSA. Yet the terms of the JCS directive creating OSS made it clear that all OSS activities within a Theater of Operations would be under the command of the Theater Commander. Without first getting this problem straightened out, the London Mission began organizing, established close liaison with its opposite British organizations (SIS and SOE) and began planning.

The SO Branch, OSS/ETO, first consisted of four men, three commissioned Army officers and one civilian. Organization for planning developed very slowly. A working agreement for coordination of activities between OSS and the British SOE had been worked out long before, in June, 1942. The agreement provided that the basis for

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operations would be one of close coordination of operational plans and of field operations to prevent:

1. "Crossing of lines".
2. Competition for agents and material.
3. The playing off of one service against the other by other governments.

The agreement considered specific areas and countries of the world in which the two organizations would be mounting operations, and set out specific understandings of the type or kind of coordination necessary for each area. As to Western European countries, especially France and the Low Countries, it was clear from the beginning that the two organizations were contemplating eventual integration of the services to some degree.

Every SO staff officer present then or assigned later was given training at one or more of the British SOE schools to learn something of the nature and capabilities of the clandestine forces with which they were concerned as staff planners.

In March, 1943, an SO planning officer was assigned to the Planning Section of SOE, London Group, on a full-time basis. In May, he became the head of the planning staff section of SO for all ETO plans.

B. Problems of OSS and SO Branch Relations with Military Command

In the meantime, the whole problem of OSS official status and structure in its relation with the military forces in the ETO was

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undergoing consideration and changes. It was necessary for the SO Chief from Washington to approach the Theater Commander, advise that the London Mission was present, explain the function of OSS, and discuss the question of military control. It was a difficult task, at first, to "sell" the capabilities of OSS to U.S. Army personnel. (However, to give an idea as to how well OSS proved its worth in the ETO, even before the beginning of Operation OVERLORD on the continent, the following is quoted from the War Diary, Vol. I, page 22--almost a year later: "The Supreme Commander in a reply to a cable from the War Department dated 30 April 1944 requesting an opinion as to whether OSS was useful to the Army, and whether or not the Army needed continued and increased help from this agency, wrote: 'The Office of Strategic Services is definitely useful to the Army in this Theater. The four separate operating branches of the OSS, plus the R & A Branch, are highly important functions necessary to the success of the projected military operations which no agencies other than the branches of OSS are prepared to fulfill. Their continued help on the scale we have requested is needed in order that the military plans which we are now completing and in some cases have begun executing, may be carried out'.")

OSS requested that it be made a military detachment under Hq ETOUSA. Ultimately this was done. Initially, all OSS activities were coordinated by and were under the staff supervision of the AC of S, G-2, of Hq ETOUSA. Later, OSS established liaison with G-5, COSSAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command). SOE addressed a letter to

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COSSAC pointing out that SOE and SO were collaborating on operational plans, and it would be desirable to bring SO under COSSAC operational control, also. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee approved a plan for giving COSSAC operational control of all SOE/SO activities in northwest Europe; CG, ETOUSA, concurred, and in November, 1943, operational control of SO activities for that area passed from ETOUSA to COSSAC.

C. Final Developments of SO Branch and British SOE Coordination

Later, some discussion was had which seemed to indicate an intention to integrate SOE/SO completely, but the SO officers at London opposed it, and complete integration was never effected. SO retained its identity. So far as France, the Low Countries, Norway and Denmark were concerned, a re-statement of understanding between SOE and SO, dated 15 April 1943, provided (SO ETO War Diary, Vol. 1, pages xxxii and xxxiii):

1. In order to coordinate activities, SOE would control and integrate operations, whether joint, or carried out individually by SOE or SO.
2. SO continued to function autonomously and was responsible for administration and control of its own agents, staff, etc.
3. SO had a representative on the SOE Planning Staff who was to be consulted on all matters affecting ^{the} the above countries; SO was to have additional representatives on such other Planning and Operational staffs as necessary to coordinate joint operations, or to coordinate SO operations with SOE operations.

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4. SOE and OSS would consult with each other regarding requests from the governments of the countries named for assistance, supplies, transport or communications facilities, "etc.", to ensure that assistance or facilities given was agreeable to both.

On 10 January 1944, a directive signed jointly by the Director of the London Group of SOE and the Chief, SO Branch, was issued stating: "Integration between the London Group of SOE and the SO Branch of OSS, ETOUSA, has taken place. Therefore, duties will be assigned to officers irrespective of the organization to which they belonged." The paper, however, contained express recognition of the separate interests of the two organizations. This "integration" was called a "partnership" in the SO War Diary, rather than a real integration.

By the end of 1943, eighteen SO officers had been attached to different Planning or Country Desk Operational Staffs or Divisions in SOE. The organization of SO Branch at the main OSS Headquarters in London had been set up on exactly parallel lines with the organization of SOE so far as planning and operations were concerned.

Although this partnership arrangement was approved by CG, ETOUSA, the JCS did not agree with it, taking the position that the interests of both nations would be served best by the continuation of independent operations by OSS under the control and direction of CG, U.S. Forces in the ETO. General Eisenhower had been appointed SCAEF by this time. At a meeting of the British Joint Intelligence Committee on 18 January 1944, it was suggested that since the partnership of SOE

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and SO already existed satisfactorily in fact, if it met with SCAEF's approval, he should so inform the JCS, which should remove their objection. This apparently was done. At any rate, the partnership continued without modification. On 1 May 1944, this partnership organization was changed in name from Headquarters, SOE/SO, to Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ). At that time, one American and one British officer served as Co-Directors, and nearly every staff and geographical section had both U.S. and British officers assigned.

The structure of SFHQ during the summer of 1944 consisted of:

(SHOW CHART)

1. The Co-Directors.
2. A "General Staff" Section of two officers, responsible for Staff coordination and supervision of all current operational matters. Officers, one U.S. and one British.
3. A "Planning Staff" Section of two officers, responsible for preparation of all advance plans for support of military operations. One U.S., one British.
4. A "Training" Staff Section. One U.S.
5. An "Air Operations" Staff Section. Two U.S., one British.
6. An "Intelligence" Staff Section. One U.S.
7. A number of geographical operational divisions and branches (desks).

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8. An "Army Staffs" Staff Section. One U.S.
9. A "Jedburgh Section". One U.S., one British.
10. An "Operational Group Section". One U.S.
11. A "Supply" Section. One U.S.
12. A "Communications" Section. One U.S., one British.
13. A "War Room" Section. Two U.S., (Sit Maps.)

The reasons for the partnership-integration were enumerated by the British officer assigned to the General Staff Section as follows (War Diary, Vol. 1, pages 11 and 12):

"The resistance elements in Western Europe have by now crystallized into loosely knit groups. As it is the task of both the organizations to assist and send supplies to these resistance groups, duplication is avoided by the integration of them. Furthermore, with two organizations of this nature pursuing an active policy amongst resistance groups there would be bound to be clashes in the field which would undoubtedly lead to loss of security and the consequent discovery by the enemy. Even if an immediate loss of life did not follow, the penetration by the enemy would probably seriously detract from the value of the groups on D-day.

"It has been decided that small staffs from SOE/SO Headquarters should accompany both army groups and armies when an invasion of the continent takes place so as to correlate the work of resistance groups with that of the military forces. It is essential, therefore, that SO Branch of OSS be in a position to obtain information

regarding resistance groups known to SOE not merely on a day-to-day but on an hour-to-hour basis.

Communication by radio to resistance groups is carried out by special radio stations in England, some of which are staffed by the SO Branch of OSS. These stations are interlocked and it would, therefore, be impractical, nay impossible, to divorce some from the others.

"Aircraft have been allocated by the Air Ministry to SOE and by the 8th USAAF to OSS. Since both air forces are serving the same resistance groups in the field it would be impractical to split, for example, France into two areas, one to be served by one air force and the remainder by the other. It is, therefore, necessary that the closest cooperation exist between these two organizations in order not only to economize in the use of aircraft but in order to prevent clashes on the continent. These clashes might be caused either by too many aircraft going to the same area on the same night, or by the majority of supplies being sent to resistance groups in one area and not spread proportionately over the whole of France.

"In the event of supplies not being pooled for the benefit of both organizations there would obviously be a duplication of orders with the result that stores will probably be shipped to Europe in excess of those actually required."

The quotation just completed gives emphasis and amplification to many of the reasons for the close coordination of the two services.

QUESTIONS?

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D. SUB-SUMMARY

1. In organizing for planning at Theater Headquarters level, it was necessary to have:

- a. A planning staff for handling current operations. This is a task being handled today by the CIA Hq and Field Station planners.
- b. A separate planning staff whose whole task was the preparation of plans for the furnishing of clandestine operational support for planned military operations. Planning by this staff was done concurrently with the preparation of the military plan by Supreme Headquarters, and very closely coordinated with the military plan. This is an exact parallel to the situation today.
- c. The war plan developed called for the use of special teams and groups to be furnished to resistance groups or to execute special coup de main missions. Staff sections were created to handle planning, training and administrations problems concerned with such teams and groups. These staff sections can be likened to special staff sections, in that they had a dual function: planning, recommending and supervision in a staff capacity; and direction and control, or executive and operational functions as their second function.
- d. War planning included planning for the type and number of SFHQ personnel that would be assigned or attached to military units in the field to coordinate plans for operations by

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resistance groups with the current military plans. As soon as the organizational plan for such personnel was developed, a separate special staff section was created to carry the plan out.

2. It appears probable that your war planning task will include working out a plan for the organization of a Theater or Sub-Theater CIA Headquarters, and for the organization and status of CIA personnel assigned or attached to military formations in the field. The brief outline of the historical record of the experience of the first U.S. personnel ever involved in a like task, given above, may furnish some leads, suggestions, or points of departure that may prove to be helpful to you.
3. As can be seen, the Director of OSS realized from the very beginning the impossibility that two allied clandestine services could organize and conduct clandestine operations of the so-called "executive action" type, or paramilitary operations, in the same area without clashes, overlappings, duplications and competitions which would be extremely dangerous to the security of the operations. It must be realized that operations of this type are totally different in nature from espionage and counterespionage operations. The very action nature of the operations creates the probability that two or more independent and uncoordinated organizations engaging in such operations in the same country, if the organizations achieve any effective size, will eventually run into conflicts with each other. These were the factors that caused the

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early coordination and later complete partnership-integration between SO Branch of OSS and the British SOE. After military operations in France and the Low Countries ended, and the military forces entered Germany, the situation changed, and there was no longer the need for such close coordination. This can be explained only by the fact that resistance and the subsequent sabotage, guerrilla, and escape and evasion nets in France and the Low Countries were highly developed and extensive in scope, while in Germany there was no such development, and all operations were of an ad hoc or "off the cuff" nature -- short range or tactical espionage missions for the most part.

From this discussion it is apparent that two principles stand out which should be ^{stated:} repeated:

- a. If clandestine paramilitary organizations of considerable size and scope are developed in the same area by two or more allied clandestine services, and those organizations will furnish operational support to an allied military operation in the same area, the activities of the clandestine nets must be coordinated between the allied services to maintain operational security and to achieve the greatest possible utilization of the organizations. The degree of coordination will depend on the size and scope of the clandestine organizations.
- b. If allied military operations are conducted in an area in which effective friendly resistance forces and paramilitary organizations have not been developed, but short

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range or tactical clandestine coup de main or espionage operations are to be conducted in support of the military effort, each country's clandestine service can conduct its own operations within the boundaries of its own military unit zones with little or no coordination with the other clandestine services.

III PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION OF WAR PLANS WITH THE OFFICIALS OF THE FREE FRENCH IN CHARGE OF RESISTANCE MATTERS.

A. Relations with the Free French Prior to D-Day

Prior to D-day itself, none of the Free French forces, including Generals DeGaulle and Koenig themselves, was given any information concerning any part of the plans for Operation OVERLORD for security reasons. The one possible exception to this situation was in May 1944, when General Koenig was informed that the invasion of the continent would start in France. This apparently was because of his official concern on behalf of the Free French with the Underground activities in France (he was DeGaulle's personal representative for such purposes), and possibly because of the part he was to have in connection with such activities later.

B. Official French Interest in SFHQ from D-Day on.

On D-day, the Supreme Commander placed General Koenig in command of all French Resistance activities. The War Diary (Vol. I, pages 26-7) states: "The situation was a peculiar one. The British and American officers at SFHQ did not welcome the idea of being merely a service organization since in this kind of operation it would be difficult to

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divorce operational and service functions. The French were considered to be ill-prepared to assume control. They lacked the necessary personnel, a fact which they readily admitted. The American and British deputies on EMFFI (l'Etat Major des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur, the name adopted for the part of SFHQ furnished to General Koenig for direction of French operations), Lieutenant Colonel van der Stricht and Mr. Brook, took orders from Colonel Haskell and Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman (the U.S. and British co-directors of SFHQ). Naturally, General Koenig made voluble objection. Nominally, control was vested in General Koenig by SFHQ, but due to its control of all the services and of air priorities in particular, it continued to exercise actual control."

C. Organization of Headquarters for French Control of Clandestine Operations in France.

On 22 June 1944, a tri-partite headquarters and staff within SFHQ concerned only with operations in France, and under command of General Koenig, was established. It was named EMFFI. It had U.S., British, and French officers, and was set apart from the rest of SFHQ, finally in a separate building. By August, 1944, the many complicating factors involved in establishing EMFFI as a separate entity had been pretty well worked out. Many sections of SFHQ had existed without identification with operations in any single or particular country; they serviced such operations in all the ETO countries. The War Diary (Vol. I, page 69) gave this description to the matter: "It was necessary to divide the duties of SFHQ

functionally into that part pertaining to France and that part pertaining to all other countries within SHAEF's sphere so that General Koenig could exercise personal control over the French division."

Sections which could not be divided, however, included:

1. The section responsible, both for execution and general administration, for submission of requirements and supplies, and for planning the packing production, ~~production~~, for operating the War Room, and some duties pertaining to target selection.
2. The one arranging air operations and administering packing stations.
3. The section providing personal documents and papers, and handling all plans for Poles in France.
4. The Special Airborne Services liaison.
5. The section handling infiltration and exfiltration of personnel, courier messages, etc.
6. Signal communications.
7. The Planning Staff for current operations.

(SHOW CHART)

The EMFFI organization finally developed included:

1. One U.S. and one British deputy under General Koenig.
The General decided to concern himself principally with close high-level liaison with SHAEF, and with the U.S.

and British Army and Air Forces, and other U.S. and British agencies, leaving to the deputies the handling of day-to-day EMFFI operations.

2. The original SFHQ French section, having two divisions (F and RF).
3. The Army Staff detachments with Army Group and Army Headquarters.
4. Relative elements of advance planning section.
5. SAS Brigade liaison.

EMFFI also was given facilities for direct liaison with the following SFHQ sections which could not be divided:

1. Signal communications.
2. Air dispatch.
3. Planning Staff for current operations.

These three sections remained under SFHQ command, but met EMFFI requirements as resources permitted.

Previous to the creation of EMFFI, all advance planning based on future operational plans of SHAEF was done by a Planning Staff in SFHQ. The elements of this Planning Staff concerned with France were placed in EMFFI, and it worked on directives given it by General Koenig the same as it had previously on directives coming directly from G-3, SHAEF.

SFHQ became the agency responsible for providing air transport, sea transport, packing of supplies, signal communications both with the Resistance forces in France and the Army Staff Detachments

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attached to military formations, to EMFFI for all operations in France. At the same time, SFHQ continued to be responsible for planning and conducting all its types of clandestine operations in all other countries in the ETO.

SUB-SUMMARY:

1. As a refinement of principles stated in the preceding sub-summary, it is apparent that when two or more allied countries have organized resistance forces in the same area, and military operations are being planned for that area, security problems may make it inadvisable or impossible to coordinate future plans with one or more of the allied countries.
2. The above may be true without influencing the necessity for coordinating current operations in the same area.
3. The situation may be one in which such coordination for current operations may involve the furnishing of all forms of signal, logistic and financial support to the allied country which is not permitted to take part in advance planning for support of military operations. When this occurs, it is a fortunate situation for our own planners, as the furnishing of such support may be the control medium for forcing the allied country to accept the restrictions against taking part in advance planning.

ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

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IV PLANS DEVELOPED AT THEATER HEADQUARTERS LEVEL FOR SUPPORT BY CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY FORCES TO THE MILITARY INVASION OF THE CONTINENT, AND TO POST-INVASION MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT.

A. Background

After the fall of France in 1940, the growth of a spirit of resistance against the occupying forces started with extreme slowness but entirely spontaneously and locally; it was given no assistance from outside the country initially. There is no historical record available which indicates how the British became aware of this growth and its potential. However, it is clear that the DeGaullist forces and the British soon learned of the development. The British were the only ones capable of doing anything about it, and they quickly gave support to the Free French and began themselves recruiting, training and dispatching agent personnel to France to encourage the development of this spirit of resistance, and then to recruit from French who indicated a desire to resist actively agents willing to carry out sabotage and guerrilla action.

QUESTIONS?

By late 1942 a very large-scale program of active resistance had been developed, much of it organized. The British obviously had been giving serious study and consideration to means of using this force to support the military operations, which were being planned for the European continent, by the time the SO Branch of OSS in the ETO came into being. Credit must be given to the British SOE for ~~the~~ originating ~~of~~ practically all the plans for the support of later military operations

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by clandestine paramilitary forces. The SO Branch of OSS deserves much credit for its later contribution in developing and perfecting those plans. SO recognized that the plans drafted and recommended by the British were sound and based on long and careful thought and testing, and on detailed experience with the resistance forces in the countries concerned.

B. First Plans and the Test of the Plans

By early 1943, COSSAC had concluded that the general missions that should guide the activities of the active Resistance forces, looking toward the ultimate military invasion, should be:

1. To assist in bringing about conditions considered essential to the success of an invasion of northwest Europe: Reduction of German Air Force strength, lowering the morale of German troops, and keeping German forces dispersed.
2. Inflicting damage to the German war machine generally.
3. Preparing to take action to give direct assistance to an Allied landing on the Continent.

Specific plans developed by the British SOE to accomplish the first and second missions mentioned included the continuation of current sabotage activities to the fullest possible extent consistent with the security of the "Resistance Groups", concentrated against:

1. The German Air Force in all its aspects.
2. Submarine repair and maintenance facilities, supplies and morale of crews.

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3. Railway locomotives and trains carrying vital war materials and troops.
4. Factories producing materials for the German war effort.
5. Shipping of all sorts including inland canal barges and canals themselves.
6. German military installations.
7. Gestapo and collaborators.
8. Any other objective, the sabotage of which would hamper the German war effort or undermine morale.

As for the mission of giving direct assistance to the Allied military effort, specific plans included:

1. Dislocation of railways by numerous planned demolitions, by derailments, by interference with the railway signalling system, and by a general strike of railway workers.
2. Interference with the movement of local enemy reserves by various means, such as road blocks, mines, tire bursters, harassing fire from small arms, bazookas, etc.
3. Arming and equipping Resistance Groups for guerrilla activities to create confusion in enemy rear areas, including attacks on small enemy headquarters, couriers, staff officers, telecommunications, dumps of all kinds. It was realized then that "in the wilder Maquis areas of France it is possible that the guerrilla activities may become so extensive as to cause a minor military diversion".

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A specific limitation of capability was expressed in connection with this statement of specific plans which is especially noteworthy, and part of it is as applicable today in connection with the development of war plans as it was then. "In considering the foregoing activities, it should be recognized that little can be done by Resistance Groups in a tactical sense as it is expected that the enemy will carry out large scale evacuations or otherwise interfere with the mobility of the inhabitants in areas within or immediately behind the lines. Furthermore, because of the substantial time lag in getting messages to the field, it usually will not be possible to assign tasks to Resistance Groups which will have a bearing on the tactical situation. On the other hand, long-term, strategical tasks will be assigned to Resistance Groups located well in the enemy's rear areas."

The planning at that time had progressed sufficiently far to include the command and control structure, including the coordination necessary with Supreme Headquarters and its G-3 Section; plans for the furnishing of staff detachments to the G-3 sections of all Army Group and Army Headquarters to advise the commanders of those formations as to the capabilities of Resistance Groups in the field, and to work out plans for the commander concerned for employment of such groups on missions which would assist the efforts of the military formation concerned, with the express limitation that such plans would be recommended to SFHQ for action; plans for the communications net necessary for control of agents and groups in the field and between

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the staff detachments and SFHQ (independent of the normal military signal communications nets); and plans for the formation, training and dispatch beginning about D-day of special teams to known Resistance Groups in the field which lacked communications with SFHQ, supplies, equipment and sometimes leadership.

[] These plans were tested in March 1943 by the British SOE taking part in maneuvers with British troops in an exercise called "Operation SPARTAN", and the plans proved to be sound. Two U.S. officers from SO Branch, OSS, took part in the SOE part of these maneuvers, one in the field [] and the other, the officer newly assigned to the SOE Planning Staff [], in the SOE control center for the maneuver. Following the test, SOE reduced their plans to a formal staff study which was submitted to the appropriate British government headquarters with recommendations for approval of the plans. The SO Branch adopted the plans, converted the language to correct U.S. Army terminology, and submitted the paper to CG, ETOUSA, with recommendations for its approval as the SO Branch plans for support of the military invasion to take place later. Approval was granted, and the plans became the basis for all subsequent development by the SO Branch in coordination with the British SOE.

C. Later Specific Plans for D-Day Action in the Field by Resistance Forces

By September 1943, plans for a coordinated program of sabotage and guerrilla attacks which would take place on signal coincidental with the military invasion of the continent had been drafted. There were


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eight separate fields of action included originally, each given the name of a plan identified by the French word for a color or another French word. Of these eight, it was determined finally to be possible and practicable to implement only three:

1. Plan Vert (green): This covered the destruction of all railway communications. Its object was to isolate areas and prevent all enemy movement to, from, and through the areas. An effort was also to be made to kill German key personnel, especially at the more important rail centers.
2. Plan Tortue (tortoise): This included road blocks and cuts whereby the enemy reinforcements, particularly armored units, would be prevented from reaching the coast in time to hold up Allied landings. This type of clandestine action today is called a Retardation program. The maximum interference was to be effected with the movement of all enemy troops. It was felt to be of vital importance to dislocate and delay the road movement of enemy reserve panzer, motorized, or infantry divisions. This was to be achieved by carefully prepared ambushes and road blocks which would depend for their success on a detailed preliminary reconnaissance. This plan was to be supplemented by other activities, such as the misdirection of traffic and general guerrilla action.
3. Plan Violet (violet): This dealt with the cutting of telecommunications which were of value to the German Army. The aim was to isolate certain areas from the rest of France or

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Germany. The full plan was dispatched to the field in May 1944, with instructions that it was to be implemented and effected in conjunction with the advice of official French Poste Telegraphique et Telephone (PTT) specialists of the long distance lines section who were already members of the organized Resistance forces all over the country.

Plans subsequently were developed and carried out to brief Resistance leaders as to their part in these over-all plans of D-day action in some cases by exfiltrating them from France to England by small aircraft, and in others by parachuting special liaison officers to them who could brief them in their assignments. The plan also provided for careful reconnaissance of assigned areas for specific targets by the Resistance leaders and their exfiltration to England to work out detailed plans for their actual operations on the ground, to be modified by radio approval later as German troop units changed locations and other factors of the situation changed. One of the most touchy problems involved in the planning was the system of sending alert and action signals to the Resistance forces in the field on an arrangement by which no saboteur or other member of the Resistance forces could know in advance the date for the invasion. It was recognized that should the Gestapo arrest any member of a net who had such information, the Gestapo's efficient methods of torture could extract it from the most obstinate human. The plan worked out consisted of

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sending signals by the BBC propaganda broadcasts beamed to France in the form of simple code phrases, such as "La rose est rouge", which meant that the groups who were to hit targets indicated by the signals were to stand by and listen each night for the following ten nights. During this time, the signal might be repeated again, which started a new time period of ten days. This might be repeated numerous times, or the ten days might pass without any repetition of the alert, or without giving the action signal. However, during any of these ten-day periods, the action signal, another simple phrase, might be given. This meant that within whatever time limit the plan for the group provided -- 24 or 48 hours -- the group was to carry out its D-day attacks on assigned targets.

The operational plans for France and low countries after D-day were simply to continue the same kind of operations, with modifications to be worked out by the coordinating efforts of the SF Detachments attached to the military formations and SFEHQ as the changing situation required.

It should be realized that the above three plans were the main over-all plans for D-day support. There were many others complementary or subsidiary to them, including separate plans for the use of special teams, special airborne units of substantial size for special coup de main missions, plans for diversionary activities in Norway and Denmark, deception cover planning for the French Resistance to assist in the

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deception as to the location of beach areas to be used for the invasion, plans for accelerated air lift of supplies to resistance forces, etc. Plans closely coordinated with the OSS and SOE forces in the Mediterranean Theater were worked out in detail as to spheres of responsibility for support of Resistance Forces in southern France, and for phasing the changes of responsibility from SFHQ in London to SPOC, the joint SOE/SO headquarters for AFHQ in the MEDTO (or SACMED), as the date for the invasion of southern France approached. (Operation "Anvil" or "Dragoon".)

D. Planning for operations in Germany

During the entire period from the creation of the SO Branch in the ETO until September 1944, the SO Branch and its partner were entirely preoccupied with planning for operations in France and the Low Countries. Absolutely no consideration had been given to the possibility of conducting clandestine operations in Germany itself. The unexpected speed with which France and the Low Countries were liberated after the breaching of the beach-head line brought to focus the need for immediate planning for Germany. Although there were some fairly reliable intelligence reports of some developments of resistance inside Germany itself, it was realized that the German internal security forces and the intense national spirit of the German population made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop any effective clandestine organization within the boundaries of the Reich. It was obvious, therefore, that any sabotage or

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guerrilla activities that were to be carried on would have to be short-range ones by agents or groups recruited for the purpose on the Allied side of the combat areas, trained, briefed, and dispatched by air, who would hit their targets and get out by exfiltration, or go into hiding until overrun.

Does anyone want more of an explanation of "short-range" sabotage or guerrilla attacks?

These kinds of operations did not require the close partnership between the British SOE and the SO Branch that operations in France and the Low Countries did. Each organization could carry on these types of operations in the zone of its own army groups without much chance of crossing of lines or conflicts between sabotage or guerrilla groups. Therefore, the SO Branch planning officers were withdrawn from SFHQ and formed a Planning Section for the SO Branch at OSS main headquarters in London. Coordination was maintained with the SOE as necessary, each keeping the other fairly closely advised as to operations being planned.

The remaining months of the war were devoted to consideration of one plan after another for the type of operations described above, all of which were scrubbed because of the "impossibility" of finding personnel capable of performing the missions. Among the groups or types of persons considered for recruitment and/or briefing and dispatch were members of an organization of Communists in France of German birth who had been members of the International Brigade

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in the Spanish Civil War (organization named "Calpo", Comite Allemagne Libre pour l'Ouest); German PW's; foreign conscripted labor in Germany, to be organized by teams of American German-speaking SO officers to be parachuted in and supplied by air; any indigenous German resistance that could be spotted and organized by such teams.

In the meantime, the SF (Army Staff) detachments that had been attached to 12th Army and First, Third and Ninth Army headquarters had been released back to OSS, and had been replaced at each of these headquarters by OSS Field Detachments of small size composed of officers representing all the operational branches of OSS working together. These detachments actually went ahead and developed successful short-range tactical espionage operations using German PW's who were carefully screened and selected. There was such poor coordination between these field detachments and OSS London Headquarters that no support of any kind came from London Headquarters despite many requests from the Field Detachments. The latter had to scrounge signal, logistic, financial and air lift support through Army channels for themselves.

The picture is clear that London was planning in an entirely fruitless manner, and the Field Detachments were operating entirely without headquarters support.

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Security InformationE. Plans Coordinated with Naval and Air Forces

Two additional aspects of planning prior to D-day for operations both on D-day and later need emphasis. Plans were developed for a program of sabotage of naval and merchant marine vessels and facilities particularly in Norwegian waters, and for some French ports. OSS had a Maritime Unit branch which was the channel for coordination with the Navy, and for procurement of small craft and equipment. The British SOE had its own research center which developed clever one-man submersible craft and other special equipment for such operations.

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Also, through close coordination with the RAF and USAF, plans for an operation known as "BLACKMAIL" were developed. Under this plan, when an industrial target in France or the Low Countries had been selected, and it was decided that aerial bombing of the target risked heavy casualties to French or other friendly civilians, or it was desired to stop production in the plant without great destruction, an officer of a sabotage group was instructed to call on the head of the industry. He would inform the industrialist that his plant had been selected for destruction by bombing, but offer to have the bombing canceled if the man would agree to the proper sabotage of his own plant, and give aid in selecting key or vital spots for the sabotage. If the victim questioned the agent's bona fides, the latter suggested that the industrialist select any phrase he would like as a test and the night he would like to have it broadcast over BBC. It was made

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clear that the industrialist had no other choice. If he did not agree, or if the agent was not heard from by his headquarters, the bombing would take place as scheduled. The plan was effective. After one or two collaborators had refused to play, their plants had been totally destroyed, and the word was spread by Resistance forces by the rumor pipe-line, excellent cooperation with good results were achieved in a large number of such operations. It should be understood that these were industrial targets selected on the basis that to stop their production was a direct and essential support to planned military operations.

Other planning involving close coordination with the Air Forces was essential in connection with Plans Vert and Tortue for retardation purposes. Questions arose in target selection as to what rail and highway bridges should be designated Air Force bombing targets, and which should be left to saboteurs. In general, large bridges, normally considered key bridges, were assigned to Air Force. Such bridges normally had strong army guard units which were too strong and heavily armed for Resistance units to attack. Consideration was given also to preserving bridges as our forces advanced. Plans provided for this that only those bridges prepared by Nazi forces for demolition would be destroyed. In some cases, Resistance forces were directed to try to preserve key bridges by disconnecting demolition charges or replacing them with dummy charges.

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F. General Problems of Planning

It is interesting to note that the directive for all plans developed for clandestine operations in support of military operations came from SHAEF. However, the SHAEF directive resulted from the closest kind of liaison between SFHQ and SHAEF G-3. It probably is safe to assume, therefore, that the directive included nothing beyond the capabilities of existing Resistance forces or of forces which reasonably could be developed by the time the support was to be given.

During the first months of war planning, the planning staff officers had no knowledge of the specific plans for military operations that were being developed. However, the SFHQ war planners were primarily concerned then with determining what kind of support clandestine forces could give military forces, how such clandestine forces could be controlled best, and what organizational structure was necessary to control the clandestine forces and advise military commanders. Therefore, the lack of knowledge of military plans was relatively insignificant. After this preliminary part of planning was accomplished, however, it became apparent that to continue war planning further it was essential that the staff officers concerned had to have some knowledge of the military operations being planned; otherwise, they would have been doing their planning in a vacuum. So it was that several months before D-day, the top command and planning staff echelons of SFHQ were given sufficient information about the planning of Operation OVERLORD so that they could begin the plans of specific clandestine operations to support the military operations being planned.

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Matters which control or affect the development of plans for clandestine paramilitary operations in support of conventional military operations which can be determined from the experience of the SO Branch of OSS include the following:

1. The mission or missions to be accomplished by the clandestine forces must be determined and stated by the commander of the military forces to be supported. However, he normally will need advice from the staff officers concerned with planning the clandestine operations as to the capabilities and limitations ^{of capabilities} thereof of the clandestine forces to insure that no mission beyond the capabilities of existing forces is assigned, or to insure that the mission does not require the build-up of Resistance forces beyond the capability of the agency responsible for building up and organizing such forces. The planners of clandestine operations obviously must be informed of the military operations planned to be able to plan clandestine support for the military operations.
2. The staff officers planning such clandestine support must have a good general understanding of clandestine paramilitary operations, their capabilities and the limitations thereof. Normally, security compartmentation within the agency responsible for organizing and controlling such forces will prevent such staff officers from having detailed knowledge of specific organizations in specific areas. Staff officers must obtain information of

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capabilities from the controlling or directing headquarters operating personnel by the closest coordination with such personnel. This actually was done by the SFHQ planners, who coordinated most closely with the country desks actually directing and controlling operations of the forces in the field.

3. Development of effective plans for such support by clandestine paramilitary forces in a friendly country occupied by a hostile power is possible regardless how effective and efficient the hostile security forces may be. It takes a long period of time to organize the clandestine forces into an effective organization. However, the picture is exactly the reverse when consideration is given to developing, organizing and controlling such forces inside a hostile power openly at war with our nation. The very factors which make the task possible in the friendly country occupied by a hostile power, i.e., national spirit or patriotism, resentment against the hostile power, the difficulties of the hostile power in maintaining powerful internal security forces at home and in the occupied area at the same time, etc., militate against such developments inside the hostile power itself, regardless how many dissident or opposition groups there may have been in the country prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

Development of effective plans for support of military operations in hostile countries, therefore, depending as they must on the ability of the operators to develop effective resistance forces in the countries, is an extremely difficult matter. As a result of the capabilities and actions of hostile security forces and

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the resulting security factors in maintaining secure clandestine paramilitary forces, staff officers must always emphasize in advising commanders that the latter can never rely on clandestine forces to produce and act as they rely on their own forces because there are too many factors affecting the existence of resistance forces beyond the control of the agency responsible for them; that the success of a military operation must never depend on clandestine operational support; that any support given by clandestine forces must be considered pure "gravy" -- a bonus force additional to the commander's own.

4. At all times during the war planning at SFHQ, great care was exercised to insure that in the conduct of sabotage and guerrilla operations prior to D-day, no operations were planned that would unduly expose the groups to the Nazi internal security forces. In other words, only operations consistent with maintaining a high degree of security were ordered. To have done otherwise would have meant, in all probability, that on D-day, no effective resistance organization would have been in existence to give support to the military operations. This illustrates a principle that must be paramount in the minds of all war planners at all times: Are the operations that are being planned for Resistance forces consistent with the maintenance of the degree of security that will permit the forces to continue to exist to fight another day.

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PRINCIPLES:

1. The general mission of clandestine support for military operations must come from the military commander. The clandestine war planners must have knowledge of as much of the plan for military operations as is necessary for them to plan intelligently specific clandestine operations to support such military operations.
2. War plans staff officers must have a good general understanding of clandestine operations and the limitations thereof. Because of security considerations, information of detailed capabilities of existing clandestine forces which will form the basis of plans for clandestine support of military operations must come from the headquarters operating personnel.
3. Because of security and control problems, support of military operations by clandestine forces must be considered as a bonus. War plans staff officers must always advise against making military operational plans which rely on the support of clandestine forces to determine the success or failure of the military action.
4. War planners, in estimating the clandestine situation and planning operations, must always weigh such operations in terms of the security hazards they impose on the clandestine forces, and remember that the clandestine force which does not maintain security ceases to be a force of any kind.

V ORGANIZATION FOR COORDINATION AT ARMY GROUP AND ARMY HEADQUARTERS LEVEL
OF PLANS FOR CLANDESTINE SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

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A. Reason for Creation of "Army Staff Detachments" and their Organization

During the early part of the war planning, it was realized that "in order that SO activities might best assist the military forces -- units from SO should be attached to the staffs of the field armies to work in close conjunction with the operational and intelligence divisions of the army staffs and to maintain liaison between the armies and resistance groups behind the enemy lines through SFHQ in London". The theory of operations was that "moving forward with the advancing armies these SO staff units would be informed of the plans and requirements of the army commanders and would inform the commanders of the capabilities of resistance groups to assist military operations. The SO staff units would be able to make quick contact with members of resistance groups overrun by the advancing armies and obtain from them information of resistance groups still behind enemy lines and of the vulnerabilities of the enemy to resistance group operations".

Accordingly, in January 1944, G-3, SHAEF, alerted headquarters of First (later 12th) Army Group and First, Third and Ninth Armies, that they could expect later to have attached to their G-3 Sections "SF Detachments" which would act as a "source of general and specific information for over-all plans for use of Resistance Groups as the development of the reoccupation of the Continent took place".

SOE furnished exactly similar SF Detachments to British Army Group and Army headquarters.

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Each of these detachments had three sections: An Operations, an Intelligence, and a Counter-Intelligence Section. The detachments themselves were not to be in direct communication with Resistance Groups on the enemy side of the combat lines, but were to direct requests for operations to be carried out by Resistance Groups direct to SFHQ in London via their own independent signal communication facilities, which went through the same radio communication facilities in England used for communication with agent and group personnel in the field. Accordingly, each of the OSS/SF Detachments had its own mobile radio signal unit, furnished by the Communications Branch of OSS. SFHQ would consolidate operational requests, determine priorities in light of orders also coming from SHAEF, and send orders to the field.

Each detachment was furnished a "Kardex" file listing every group and its officers known to SFHQ, operations which each group had conducted, the group's location, its state of armament and other pertinent information. As soon as these files were furnished to the detachments, and prior to D-day as well as after, SFHQ began furnishing to the detachments immediately the latest situation reports concerning the groups, which the Intelligence Sections of the detachments posted in the Kardex, keeping them up to date. The duty of the Operations Section was to keep informed as to each group, to attend the daily staff meeting at the headquarters to which attached, and be prepared to advise the commander as to the capability of Resistance Forces to carry out operations desired; then to work out plans for

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support as desired by the commander for transmission to SFHQ as requests. The Counter-intelligence Section had the staff duty of keeping informed as to the security status of all groups, making estimates based on the situation reports received from SFHQ and on interrogations of overrun group members, and advising the detachment commander and the operations section personnel accordingly. They had the operational duty, in addition, of contacting overrun Resistance personnel, identifying them to prevent the use of Resistance cover by enemy forces to plant agents, interrogating them for intelligence or CI information and disseminating such information through proper channels, and then either to turn over such personnel to the Operations Section if any operational missions of a "line-crossing" nature were planned for them, or of disposing of them by arranging air lift back to England. Experience in the field by the CI Sections demonstrated the need for authority and funds to set up "safe houses" near the headquarters to which the Detachments were attached where overrun agent personnel could be housed, messed and interrogated under proper security safeguards.

B. Results Achieved by SF Detachments in France

Except for the last mentioned item, the above outline states the plan of operation of the detachments in advance of actual experience in the field. In all probability, had the military operations in France proceeded more in accordance with the expected speed, the plan would have worked fairly well. There never was an opportunity to give the plan a fair trial for the following reasons:

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1. The original beach-head area was one that had been "written off" by SFHQ so far as organized sabotage or guerrilla forces were concerned, for the reason that the Nazi forces were so thick on the ground in all beach areas it was felt impossible successfully to infiltrate agents into such areas to organize the local or indigenous resistance elements, and to carry out executive type operations on any scale commensurate with the risks involved. The result was that when the SF Detachment with First U.S. Army was landed on the beach, about D+3, and the CI Section personnel began interviewing French civilians, they learned that there were large numbers of French who had set up their own limited organization, tied in with the Free French Resistance controlled by SFHQ, but these people had never got weapons, ammunitions, or other supplies, had no direct radio communication with England, and had engaged for the most part in clandestine intelligence information gathering for which they had not had special training. They had been further handicapped by a lack of rapid means of reporting same, having to exfiltrate it to the interior where resistance forces did have communications with SFHQ in England. During the first days in the beach-head area, and while combat remained fairly fluid, these people claimed (and proved) an ability to get through the combat lines with ease. They volunteered to go through the lines to contact members of their organizations not yet overrun, to

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brief them on intelligence targets to look for and start them working through the combat lines to the Allied area bringing such information. A system for this type of tactical intelligence information gathering was worked out and put into operation, with officers from the SF Detachment going forward to Corps and Division headquarters to handle such missions. No effort was made at any time to work out the long-range strategic operational plans to impede the movement of Nazi reserve divisions by rail or highway sabotage at Army headquarters. General Bradley did make a request very early to have resistance forces near the combat areas carry out widespread cutting of telecommunications means to force Nazi communications to take to the air via radio, which would give an opportunity to Army Signal Security Detachments to intercept and decipher. This was strictly a tactical operation in a relatively small area. Once the beach-head line became solidly established and mobile or fluid warfare (as distinguished from static) ceased, the line crossing operations came virtually to a standstill.

2. The greatest single factor militating against the use of the SF Detachments in the manner planned, however, is stated in the War Diary as follows: "The general conception of the function of an SF Detachment was that it would serve as a liaison between the field forces and SFHQ in London for the

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planning and execution of strategic missions by resistance groups behind the enemy lines. Just as soon as the staff was established with the field forces in Normandy, it became apparent that the army commanders expected to use these staffs for close-in tactical work without reference to SFHQ. Every corps, every division, in fact all front line units were confronted with the problem of what to do with Frenchmen they overran in the course of battle. Many of these Frenchmen came up and introduced themselves as resistance workers able and willing to carry out short-range missions involving infiltration through the enemy lines. While the combat forces were interested in interference with enemy communications and other typical SO missions, they were far more interested in obtaining intelligence information of the enemy, by the use of these resistance workers who were all so closely tied in to SOE/SO." In other words, the army commanders failed to understand the real capabilities of the SF Detachments and the major contribution they offered in support of the military operations.

3. After the beach-head line finally was ruptured, the Allied advance was so rapid and so unpredictable that in those instances where efforts were made to use the services of SF Detachments in the manner planned, missions planned nearly always were aborted because of the rapid Allied advance, or,

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where carried out, had little chance to accomplish anything because by the time orders were sent to the field via the communications facilities in the U.K., and the field forces organized to carry out the mission, Allied forces had arrived in the area where the mission was laid on.

C. Change in Organization of Field Units Accompanying Army Formations in Germany.

During the operations in France, Belgium and Holland, where resistance forces were highly organized and large in number, it had been felt necessary to furnish to Army Group and Army headquarters the separate SF Detachments for the exclusive purpose of coordinating resistance operations to give support to military operations. Other branches of OSS, such as the Secret Intelligence (SI) and Special Counter-Intelligence (X-2), furnished separate detachments to the G-2 Sections at each of such headquarters. But in Germany, where there was no organized resistance controlled by OSS, there was no need for such a large amount of personnel as represented previously by the separate detachments. Further, operations in Germany were limited almost entirely to short-range tactical espionage missions. To plan and conduct all operational missions, OSS withdrew the original detachments, and replaced them with small joint missions having officers qualified to carry out such functions regardless of which type of mission was desired.

SUB-SUMMARY:

1. In areas where resistance forces are large and well organized, military formations need small staff units of specialists who

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know the field of clandestine sabotage and guerrilla operations to coordinate plans for clandestine operations in support of military operations as the military situation develops and changes. The staff units should include sections charged with the responsibility for the physical and security control of resistance personnel overrun ~~overrun~~ and picked up or otherwise coming into the staff's headquarters. Where the operations are in such areas, it is probable that best results will be achieved by having separate staff detachments representing the two major operational branches of the clandestine services; that is, resistance type activities, and espionage and counter-espionage.

2. In areas where resistance forces are small or non-existent and the clandestine resistance organization can contribute nothing more than short-range coup de main or tactical sabotage or guerrilla attacks, best results appear to be achieved by the furnishing of small joint staff units composed of representatives of all operational branches concerned. Such staffs can work out the plans for and conduct short-range operational missions by infiltrations through the lines, beach landings, parachute drops, etc. The staffs should be augmented with personnel qualified to provide secure holding and training facilities for the agent personnel to be used on such missions.
3. Considerations must be given to providing Air Force and Navy headquarters with qualified staff personnel for planning operations to meet the special requirements of such forces.

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VI LESSONS LEARNED

1. Officers furnished by a clandestine service to plan support for military operations must have a sound general knowledge of the clandestine forces concerned.
2. Close coordination must take place between allied clandestine services planning clandestine resistance support for allied military operations in any area where resistance forces developed by those services are strong.
3. Such coordination is not necessary for support furnished by espionage forces.
4. War planning staff officers furnished by a clandestine service to U.S. military headquarters must educate military personnel to understand:
 - a. The character of support clandestine resistance forces can give to military operations.
 - b. That the primary responsibility of the clandestine service is strategic in nature.
5. The need of military forces, particularly army at army group, field army and lower echelon headquarters, for tactical support by clandestine forces cannot be ignored, but must be given as a secondary mission.
6. Support of military operations by resistance forces must not be planned which will prevent such forces from maintaining a reasonable degree of security; otherwise, there will soon be no resistance forces to give support.
7. Plans for clandestine operational support of military operations must be limited to those capable of being supported logistically by the military forces.